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deterrence through partnership, awareness raising, and outreach. Its achievements in 2013 reflect OAI’s 
close partnership and teamwork with ADB’s governance and operations departments as well as external 
partners to address fraud, corruption, abuse of resources, and other violations that undermine the 
integrity and effectiveness of ADB-funded activities. 
Keywords 
Asia, corruption, development, governance, Asian Development Bank 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Asian Development Bank. (2014). Office of Anticorruption and Integrity: Annual report 2013. Manila: 
Author. 
Required Publisher's Statement 
This article was first published by the Asian Development Bank (www.adb.org). 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl/352 
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
Office of Anticorruption and Integrity
Annual Report 2013
The Office of Anticorruption and Integrity (OAI) helps the Asian Development Bank (ADB) ensure that 
development funds entrusted to it are not misused through fraud or corruption. This publication highlights 
OAI’s activities in 2013 such as investigating allegations of integrity violations; proactively reviewing projects; 
providing integrity due diligence support; and informing and empowering staff, civil society, and the private 
sector with tools to fight fraud and corruption in ADB projects.
About the Asian Development Bank
ADB’s vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its developing member 
countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people. Despite the region’s many successes, 
it remains home to two-thirds of the world’s poor: 1.7 billion people who live on less than $2 a day, with 
828 million struggling on less than $1.25 a day. ADB is committed to reducing poverty through inclusive 
economic growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and regional integration.
Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Its main instruments for 
helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans, equity investments, guarantees, grants, 
and technical assistance.
AsiAn Development BAnk
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City
1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
www.adb.org
ANNUAL
REPORT
2013
OFFICE OF ANTICORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY
ANNUAL
REPORT
2013
OFFICE OF ANTICORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
© 2014 Asian Development Bank
All rights reserved. Published in 2014. 
Printed in the Philippines.
ISBN 978-92-9254-438-6 (Print), 978-92-9254-439-3 (PDF)
ISSN 2226-7247 (Print), 2226-7255 (PDF)
Publication Stock No. RPT146344
Cataloging-In-Publication Data
Asian Development Bank.
  Office of Anticorruption and Integrity: Annual Report 2013.
Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2014.
1. Anticorruption and integrity.    2. Asian Development Bank.    3. Annual report. 
I. Asian Development Bank.
Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the data used in this publication. Variations in data in ADB 
publications often result from different publication dates, although differences may also come from source and 
interpretation of data. ADB does not accept responsibility for any consequence of their use.
By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term “country” in 
this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.
ADB encourages printing or copying information exclusively for personal and noncommercial use with proper 
acknowledgment of ADB. Users are restricted from reselling, redistributing, or creating derivative works for commercial 
purposes without the express, written consent of ADB.
Note:
In this publication, “$” refers to US dollars.
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City
1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
Tel +63 2 632 4444
Fax +63 2 636 2444
www.adb.org
For orders, please contact: 
Public Information Center
Fax +63 2 636 2584
adbpub@adb.org
Printed on recycled paper
iii
Contents
2013 Highlights iv
2013 at a Glance v
Abbreviations vi
Executive Summary vii
Protecting Project Funds through Project Procurement–Related Reviews—Bridging Gaps 
 in Project Implementation 1
The Offi  ce of Anticorruption and Integrity: Our Work 6
 Complaint Intake and Screening 6
 Investigations and Sanctions 6
 IOC Decisions and Proposed Sanctions 7
 Appeals 8
 Due Diligence 10
 AML and IDD Working Groups 12
 Whistleblower Protection in OAI Investigations 12
 Learning and Development 12
 Collaboration with Multilateral Development Banks  15
Appendixes
 1 The Offi  ce of Anticorruption and Integrity 17
 2 A Sample of Cases Concluded in 2013 Involving ADB-Financed Activities 18
 3 A Sample of Cases in 2013 Involving ADB Staff  21
 4 Process for Dealing with Allegations of Integrity Violations by ADB Staff  23
 5  Process for Dealing with Allegations of Integrity Violations Involving Bidders, Consultants, 
Contractors, Suppliers, or Other Third Parties in ADB-Related Activities 24
 6 Project Procurement–Related Review Process 25
 7 How to Report Fraud or Corruption 26
OFFICE OF ANTICORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY
iv
Complaints Focus of Investigations
Types of Investigations
2013 Highlights
79%
11%
9% 1%
Projects ADB Staff 
Private Sector Others (e.g., sanction 
violation, staff  consultants)
87%
250 123 
complaints 
received
came from 
external parties, 
115 came from 
ADB staff , 9 came 
from anonymous 
complainants, and 3 
from audit reviews
of complaints alleged 
integrity violations in 
ADB projects while 
13% complained about 
ADB staff 
Subject of Complaints
Project Procurement–Related Reviews
Regional
Department
2
CWRD
2
SARD
1
1
2
3
2
SERD
1
EARD
By Sector
= Agricultural and Natural Resources
= Energy
= Health and Social Protection
= Transport and ICT
Coercion 2%
Fraud and 
Corruption 2%
Corruption 14%
Collusion 13%
Others 9%
Fraud 60%
v2013 at a Glance
Carryover complaints at the beginning of 2013 104
Carryover investigations at the beginning of 2013 147
2013 Milestones 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter Total
New complaints received 50 51 83 66 250
Individuals sanctioned 11 10 5 4 30
Firms sanctioned 9 8 8 6 31
Individuals/fi rms reinstated 0 1 9 0 10
Individuals/fi rms reprimanded 2 3 2 0 7
Individuals/fi rms issued warning letters 4 9 8 6 27
Cross debarred entities from the WB, EBRD, 
and IADB 47 204 56 17 324
Entities submitted for cross debarment to 
IADB, WB, EBRD 4* 0 0 1 5
Project procurement–related reviews conducted 1(Pakistan)
2
(Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic)
1
(Azerbaijan)
3
(Nepal [2],
People's 
Republic of 
China [1])
7
Regional seminars on anticorruption conducted 1(Philippines)
3
(Philippines, 
Afghanistan, 
Viet Nam)
0
2
(Bangladesh,
Cambodia)
6
Presentations on project design management, 
departmental retreats, inductions, orientations, 
integrity due diligence, and other training for 
ADB staff 
11 12 5 12 40
Presentations on the Anticorruption Policy 
conducted for business delegations and ADB 
Board of Directors
1 1 0 1 3
MDB integrity forums/investigators conferences 
attended, and interagency consultations 
attended/coordinated
0 3 3 0 6
Learning and development programs attended 
by OAI staff  members 18 4 2 3 27
EBRD = European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IADB = Inter-American Development Bank, MDB = multilateral development bank, 
WB = World Bank.
* One of the fi rms submitted for cross debarment was withdrawn on 25 October 2013.
vi
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Abbreviations
ADB – Asian Development Bank
BPMSD  – Budget, Personnel, and Management Systems Department
DMC  – developing member country
IDD – integrity due diligence
IOC  – Integrity Oversight Committee
MDB  – multilateral development bank
OAI  – Offi  ce of Anticorruption and Integrity
PPRR  – project procurement–related review
RETA – regional technical assistance
SAC – Sanction Appeals Committee
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Executive Summary
Corruption is not single-celled. It does not move 
in just one direction and has many causes and 
symptoms. It has no single cure and will continue 
to grow and fester unless addressed from 
multiple fronts.
The Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) Offi  ce of 
Anticorruption and Integrity (OAI) recognizes 
that tackling corruption requires a multifaceted 
approach and a comprehensive network of 
partnerships and alliances. Tasked to ensure that 
the fi nite development funds entrusted to ADB 
are not misused as a result of fraud and corruption, 
OAI relies on close collaborations with internal 
and external partners and stakeholders to fulfi ll its 
mandate. OAI’s mandate is underpinned by ADB’s 
zero tolerance to corruption. It is aligned with ADB’s 
broader commitment to combat corruption and 
improve governance as a core strategic objective 
of ADB Strategy 2020, and the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Eff ectiveness of 2005—to which ADB is a 
signatory—in support of eff ective, transparent, and 
accountable aid.
More than ever, in 2013 OAI’s anticorruption work 
focused on prevention, oversight, investigation, and 
deterrence through partnership, awareness raising, 
and outreach. Its achievements in 2013 refl ect 
OAI’s close partnership and teamwork with ADB’s 
governance and operations departments as well as 
external partners to address fraud, corruption, abuse 
of resources, and other violations that undermine the 
integrity and eff ectiveness of ADB-funded activities.1
Investigating Allegations
In 2013, OAI received 250 complaints, surpassing the 
previous record of 240 received in 2012.2 It converted 
92 complaints into investigations and processed 
sanctions imposed on 30 individuals and 31 fi rms. 
Almost half of the complaints came from ADB staff , 
highlighting their crucial role in combating threats to 
the integrity and eff ectiveness of ADB’s development 
work. Fraud related to work experience, qualifi cations, 
and technical and fi nancial capacities of consulting 
fi rms or consultants continues to be the most common 
type of integrity violation reported to OAI.
ADB continued to use sanctions as a remedial 
measure to protect the integrity of ADB-fi nanced, 
supported, and administered activities. In justifi ed 
circumstances, ADB also utilized temporary 
sanctions to manage integrity and reputational 
risks arising from continued involvement with 
fi rms and individuals that are the subject of an 
OAI investigation.
1 Governance offi  ces include the Budget, Personnel, and Management Systems Department; Controller’s Department; Independent 
Evaluation Department; Offi  ce of Administrative Services; Offi  ce of the Auditor General; Offi  ce of Cofi nancing Operations; Offi  ce of the 
General Counsel; Offi  ce of Risk Management; Operations Services and Financial Management Department; and Regional and Sustainable 
Development Department. The operations departments are the Central and West Asia Department, East Asia Department, Pacifi c 
Department, Private Sector Operations Department, South Asia Department, and Southeast Asia Department.
2 104 complaints and 147 investigations were carried over from 2012 into 2013.
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Conducting Proactive Reviews
In collaboration with ADB operations departments, 
OAI has continued to roll out targeted project 
procurement–related reviews (PPRRs). In 2013, 
OAI conducted seven new PPRRs and issued three 
reports for PPRRs conducted in 2012. Summarized 
fi ndings from PPRRs conducted since 2003 have 
been injected into OAI’s training and awareness-
raising initiatives. These are described in more detail 
in pages 1 to 6 of this report.
Enhancing Due Diligence
In 2013, as ADB increased its commitment to private 
sector development and private sector operations 
and as part of Strategy 2020, OAI’s due diligence 
advisory function saw a dramatic uptake. In its 
second full year of carrying out its additional mandate 
of providing independent advice on integrity due 
diligence (IDD) and anti-money-laundering and 
combating the fi nancing of terrorism (AML/CFT) 
risks, requests for advice from OAI increased from 
15 in 2012 to 253 in 2013.
Empowering through 
Knowledge Sharing
OAI has continued to expand its awareness-raising 
activities to proactively inform staff , civil society, 
and the private sector about the negative impacts of 
fraud and corruption. Staff  training emphasizes the 
role and responsibility of ADB staff  in implementing 
ADB’s Anticorruption Policy. OAI also actively 
encourages staff  to be discerning and to undertake 
due diligence and confl ict of interest checks as 
eff ective preventive measures against corruption and 
to mitigate integrity risks.
ADB-fi nanced project: Experts taking soil sample as part of a project review
Photo: OAI
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In 2013, in conjunction with ADB’s “iAct—I Fight 
Corruption” internal anticorruption outreach 
campaign, ADB celebrated International 
Anticorruption Day, focusing its outreach on 
resident mission colleagues. During the celebration, 
ADB President Takehiko Nakao stressed to staff  
the need for collective action against corruption 
so that ADB can make a diff erence for the benefi t 
of the people it serves.
Joining Forces with Other MDBs
Likewise, the fi ght against corruption requires a 
global partnership to promote a unifi ed front against 
corruption. In 2013, OAI continued to share its 
experience and expertise at multilateral development 
bank (MDB) forums. In particular, over the past years 
OAI has been sharing its PPRR approach and lessons 
learned with other development partners worldwide. 
The wider adoption of the PPRR model was proposed 
by OAI as an anticorruption tool during the annual 
Conference of International Investigators of United 
Nations Organizations and Multilateral Financial 
Institutions held in July 2013.
Future Developments
OAI will maintain its awareness-raising programs to 
mobilize greater staff  engagement, understanding, 
and support of ADB’s Anticorruption Policy in 
a manner that strengthens ADB’s development 
agenda. OAI also continues to raise awareness 
on spotting red fl ags of corruption and fraud, and 
the harmful eff ects of corruption among ADB's 
developing and developed member countries.
In line with the President’s instruction on 
Reforming ADB’s Institution-Wide Knowledge 
Management, OAI will maintain its coordination 
with resident missions and operations departments 
to make them fully aware of OAI’s PPRR work and 
fi ndings from these reviews. Accordingly, ADB will 
continue to provide external partners, such 
as executing agencies and external stakeholders, 
with consistent advice related to lessons learned 
from PPRRs. 
Consistent with similar reviews being conducted by 
other MDBs, ADB is also in the process of further 
evaluating its appeals process to ensure due process, 
fairness, and consistency while preserving the 
administrative nature of ADB’s procedures. To this 
end, OAI expects to update its Integrity Principles 
and Guidelines in 2014.
Finally, to ensure lasting impact on its eff orts 
against corruption, OAI will continue to align its 
work program with ADB’s broader commitment to 
aid eff ectiveness.

1Protecting Project Funds through Project 
Procurement–Related Reviews—
Bridging Gaps in Project Implementation
The Offi  ce of Anticorruption and Integrity (OAI) was 
the fi rst among international fi nancial institutions to 
pioneer project procurement–related reviews (PPRRs). 
Initiated in 2003, PPRRs have resulted in prevention 
methodologies which mitigate risks of fraud and 
corruption and protect project funds from improper 
use. Since then, OAI has continuously shared lessons 
learned from PPRRs and assisted its development 
partners in such proactive review approaches.1
During PPRRs, project outputs are inspected, internal 
controls are assessed, and irregularities and possible 
noncompliance are identifi ed. PPRRs help project 
teams, executing agencies, and implementing 
agencies to identify and develop preventive 
measures to mitigate fi duciary risks, improve project 
management, and enhance project implementation.
OAI pioneered proactive reviews in 2003 
and shared PPRR methodologies with 
development partners
Assets inventory of a power project as part of a PPRR
Photo: OAI
Operations staff  use PPRR recommendations 
to develop action plans in collaboration with 
government agencies to improve project 
implementation of existing and similar 
projects they administer
1 PPRRs are not investigations; they are proactive reviews intended to assist ADB and executing agencies to improve project management 
and implementation.
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Steps in Creating the Action Plan
In 2013, the Government of Nepal partnered with 
ADB to implement the recommendations in a PPRR 
report. Representatives from ADB's Nepal Resident 
Mission and Nepal’s Ministry of Finance shared 
their positive experiences from this collaboration 
during the Anticorruption Day events at the ADB 
headquarters in December 2013.
Review of road project detects fl awed construction (drainage 
shortcomings)
Photo: OAI
During 2006–2013, ADB project staff  responsible 
for project implementation in Cambodia, Viet Nam, 
Sri Lanka, Nepal, Mongolia, the Philippines, 
Bangladesh, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(Lao PDR), and Azerbaijan participated in the conduct 
of OAI-led PPRRs. Staff  worked closely with OAI to 
assess the project’s compliance with ADB’s policies, 
guidelines, and loan/grant agreements, with a focus on 
detecting and preventing fraud and corruption.
Project Procurement–Related 
Review Activities in 2013
In 2013, OAI conducted seven PPRRs, four of which 
were requested by operations departments. In 
addition, OAI issued three reports for PPRRs which 
had been conducted in 2012. OAI also conducted 
fi ve PPRR-related training sessions following requests 
from operations departments.
Quote from the head of an executing agency 
upon completion of a PPRR in 2013:
“(The) PPRR mission helped us a lot. We 
were able to understand the weakness of 
the project implementation and immediately 
took all corrective actions…We hope such 
PPRR missions (would) be conducted for 
all projects to improve the quality of project 
implementation.” 
• Action Plan Preparation and Circulation
• Government's Commitment in Improving 
Project Implementation
• Implementation Status of Action Plan
• RM Evaluation of Implementation 
of Action Plan
• Next Plan of Action
3The bid evaluation committee adopted a diff erent set of fi nancial criteria to assess bidders’ access to fi nancial 
resources other than those presented and agreed to by ADB. As a result, contracts were awarded to fi rms with 
insuffi  cient fi nancial capacity.
Subsequently, these contracts experienced signifi cant implementation delays and challenges due to the 
contractors’ inability to meet contract-related fi nancial commitments. In an earlier investigation, multiple points of 
similarity were found between the proposals of Consortium A and Consortium B. OAI found that senior offi  cers of 
sanctioned Firm X had played leading roles in forming both consortiums, including writing the competing proposals.
OAI’s PPRR report highlighted the implementation delays and project losses which resulted from the incorrect 
evaluation of the winning fi rms’ fi nancial capacity and advised project teams and executing agencies to verify 
compliance for future bid evaluations.
Case Study: Noncompliance with Financial Criteria Results in Implementation Delays 
and Project Losses
Protecting Project Funds through Project Procurement–Related Reviews
Table 1 PPRRs Conducted in 2013
Loan/Grant No. Project Location
Loan 2581-NEP(SF)
Grant 0181-NEP(SF)
Airport Transport Capacity Enhancement Project Nepal
Loan 2685-NEP(SF)
Grant 0225-NEP(SF)
Subregional Transport Enhancement Project Nepal
Loan 2436-PRC
Grant 0113-PRC(SF)
Ningxia Integrated Ecosystem and Agricultural Development Project People’s Republic 
of China
Grant 0144-LAO(SF)
Grant 0145-LAO(SF)
Sustainable Natural Resource Management and Productivity 
Enhancement Project
Lao PDR
Grant 0232-LAO(SF) Second Greater Mekong Subregional Communicable Diseases Control Lao PDR
Loan 2354-AZE
Loan 2355-AZE(SF)
Road Network Development Program Azerbaijan
Loan 2289-PAK
Loan 2290-PAK(SF)
Loan 2396-PAK
Power Transmission Enhancement Investment (Tranche 1 and 2) Pakistan
Table 2 Reports Issued for PPRRs Conducted in 2012
Loan/Grant No. Project Location
Loan 2087-MON(SF)
Loan 2621-MON(SF)
Grant 0199-MON(SF)
Regional Road Development Project and its Supplementary Project Mongolia
Loan 2371-SRI(SF)
Grant 0091-SRI(SF)
Education for Knowledge Society Project Sri Lanka
Loan-2311-PHI
Grant 0071-PHI(SF)
Integrated Coastal Resources Management Project Philippines
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Common Findings from PPRRs
The charts below illustrate common fi ndings from PPRRs conducted over the past 11 years (since 2003). 
Redacted PPRR reports are available on ADB’s website.2
Figure 1: Procurement Cycle Irregularities and Noncompliance
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Figure 2: Asset Inspection Irregularities and Noncompliance
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Figure 3: Financial Management Irregularities and Noncompliance
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The Offi  ce of Anticorruption and Integrity: 
Our Work 
Complaint Intake and Screening
OAI receives complaints of integrity violations3 
from both named and anonymous complainants. 
At the beginning of 2013, OAI had 251 open cases 
comprising of 104 open complaints and 147 open 
investigations. During 2013, OAI received 250 new 
complaints related to ADB-fi nanced, -supported or 
-administered activities based in 26 countries.
Of these new cases received in 2013, 115 came from 
ADB staff , 3 from audits, 123 from external sources, 
and 9 from anonymous sources. Complainants 
preferred to contact OAI via e-mail, which 
accounted for 84% of all complaints received. 
In 2013, 106 complaints were closed because they 
did not meet the assessment criteria while 92 were 
converted into investigations. At the end of the year, 
156 complaints were still undergoing review.
Investigations and Sanctions
Although OAI’s mandate has broadened in recent 
years, investigating allegations of integrity violations 
remains a central part of OAI’s work.
The 92 complaints, which OAI converted into 
investigations in 2013, represent a slight decrease 
from the complaint conversions from the previous 
year. OAI identifi ed two major reasons for this drop in 
3 Integrity violations include fraudulent, corrupt, collusive, coercive, or obstructive practices; confl icts of interest or abuse involving ADB-
fi nanced, supported, and administered activities; and alleged misconduct by ADB staff .
During the course of a staff  investigation* based on a report from a resident mission, OAI found that a consultant 
colluded with an ADB staff  member to obtain an ADB contract. The ADB staff  member submitted a false 
CV on behalf of the consultant, which misrepresented the consultant’s employment and experience. The 
consultant knowingly facilitated the staff  member’s misrepresentations to ADB even though the consultant had 
no qualifi cation to complete the assignment. The consultant was also aware that the ADB staff  member would 
subcontract the assignment to another consultant.
The consultant did not dispute OAI’s fi ndings of fraudulent and collusive practices and accepted a proposed 
sanction of 6-year debarment.
*  OAI referred its fi ndings related to the staff  member to the Budget, Personnel and Management Systems Department. The staff  
member was dismissed.
Case Study—Consultant Colluded with Staff  Member and Engaged in Fraudulent 
Misrepresentations
7conversions. First, OAI received a record number4 of 
complaints during the year. Second, the high increase 
in the demand for OAI’s due diligence services 
adversely impacted conversion rates.
During 2013, OAI handled 239 investigations. Of 
these, a total of 76 investigations—including 71 
carried over from previous years—were closed. At 
the end of 2013, OAI had a total of 163 open and 
ongoing investigations.
Although OAI conducts its investigations 
independently of operations departments, one 
concrete and positive development during 2013 
has been the continued growth in the level of 
cooperation in the investigation of complaints 
between OAI and the operations departments, 
particularly resident missions. Despite its 
independent investigation process, OAI frequently 
fi nds that integrity violations are not mutually 
exclusive from operations matters as the following 
case study illustrates.
The majority of OAI’s investigations involve 
allegations of fraud, accounting for approximately 
60% of all cases converted. The majority of 
complaints of fraud tend to involve some form of 
material misrepresentation, whether it is stating 
inaccurate qualifi cations in CVs or, more disturbingly, 
claiming of false work experience by fi rms bidding for 
contracts both large and small. Given their inherently 
secretive nature, investigations into complaints 
of corruption and collusion remain complex and 
challenging. These two integrity violations represent 
approximately 17% and 10%, respectively, of 
conversions during 2013. This is generally consistent 
with previous years. 
IOC Decisions and 
Proposed Sanctions
The Integrity Oversight Committee (IOC) meets 
monthly, or as needed, to determine whether there 
is a basis to impose remedial action (i.e., debarment, 
debarment with conditional reinstatement, or 
conditional nondebarment) on fi rms and individuals 
based on OAI’s written submission, which includes 
any responses or documents submitted by the 
subject(s) of interest, and any other information the 
IOC might request. In 2013, the IOC held 8 meetings 
and sanctioned 20 fi rms and 19 individuals.
4 250 complaints were received in 2013 compared to 240 in 2012.
A complainant raised concerns of possible corruption and the use of substandard materials on a small 
infrastructure project in a developing member country. While the use of substandard materials is usually a matter 
for the operations department, it may also amount to a fraudulent practice. The resident mission worked with 
OAI to engage an expert to examine the project. When the expert advised that there may be problems with the 
materials used, OAI again worked with the resident mission to obtain additional samples of the materials used in 
the construction for further testing. These tests tended to confi rm the original fi ndings. In the interim, the resident 
mission has been working with the executing agency to resolve the concerns at a project implementation level. 
While the investigation is ongoing, this case provides an excellent example of how OAI can work with operations 
departments in the interest of the overall success of the project.
Case Study—Working with Resident Missions to Investigate Use of Substandard Materials
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In addition, 11 fi rms and 11 individuals accepted OAI’s 
proposed sanctions negating the need to present the 
cases to the IOC for a decision. Firms and individuals 
accepting proposed sanctions agree not to appeal 
the sanction and the debarment period. Proposed 
sanctions, therefore, reduce the administrative demand 
on the IOC and provide an effi  cient and institutionally 
cost-saving means for resolving integrity violations.
Appeals
An individual or fi rm sanctioned by the IOC is 
entitled to an appeal within 90 days from the date 
of the notice to the individual or fi rm of the IOC’s 
decision. The Sanction Appeals Committee (SAC) 
will consider an appeal upon two conditions. First, 
the appeal should include information that was 
OAI investigated Firms A and B for collusive practice due to the near identical contents of their bids. When 
presented with OAI’s fi ndings for collusive practice, Firm A responded that it had not submitted the proposal 
and that the purported signature of its managing director on the proposal was forged. Firm A informed OAI that 
it discovered that it was Firm B that submitted the proposal without Firm A’s knowledge and consent. Firm A 
attached a letter from Firm B admitting to the fraud.
When presented with the evidence from Firm A, Firm B and its president director did not contest OAI’s fi ndings of 
fraudulent practice and accepted OAI’s proposed sanction of 3-year debarment.
Case Study—Firm Sanctioned for Submitting Bid in the Name of Another Firm without 
the Latter’s Knowledge and Consent
Two resident missions collaborated and identifi ed red fl ags in a bid security submitted by a bidder, Firm X, for two 
separate road development projects. The red fl ags included incorrect contact numbers and irregularities in the 
format of the bid security and the name and signature of the bank offi  cer. However, the resident missions were 
unable to confi rm the validity of the bid security with the issuing bank, and the matter was referred to OAI as a 
possible case of fraudulent practice.
The named issuing bank confi rmed to OAI that it did not issue the bid securities in question. OAI immediately 
shared this fi nding with the resident missions and the operations department. Subsequently, one of the contracts 
was awarded to a diff erent fi rm, but the bid evaluation committee for the second contract identifi ed further 
shortfalls, rejected all bids, and instead proposed rebidding.
In response to OAI’s inquiries, Firm X claimed, through its manager, that the bid documents—including the bid 
security—were submitted by its authorized agent without its knowledge and consent. However, Firm X had signed 
a power of attorney authorizing the agent to act on its behalf. Firm X also provided OAI with erroneous contact 
details for the agent. Firm X partly cooperated with OAI’s investigation by admitting that the bid security was 
falsifi ed, but it obstructed the investigation by providing misleading information.
As a consequence, the IOC debarred Firm X and its manager for 4 years each, and cautioned the agent.
Case Study—Resident Missions’ Collaboration Result in Sanctions
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While reviewing the “no-objection” request from the executing agency for a $19 million drinking water supply 
project, ADB procurement offi  cers observed that the evaluated price of Firm X, the fi rst-ranked bidder, was 
$2.2 million higher than the bid opening price. Other red fl ags were identifi ed, including the observation that 
the fi nancial bid evaluation report submitted by the executing agency contained handwritten corrections and 
adjustments. The Operations Services and Financial Management Department requested that OAI conduct an 
urgent inquiry.
OAI determined that less than 12 months earlier, Firm X was declared technically nonresponsive on a similar water 
supply project valued at $10 million, on the grounds that it had insuffi  cient experience on similar projects. Yet less 
than 12 months later, Firm X claimed to have the experience to conduct a project of nearly twice the value of the 
previous contract for which it had unsuccessfully applied. When the technical proposals submitted by Firm X for 
the projects were compared, it was found that a number of end-user certifi cates pertaining to the same projects 
diff ered signifi cantly in scope and cost.
In light of the strong evidence of fraudulent practice, and as the contract was about to be awarded, the IOC 
approved the temporary suspension of Firm X for 6 months. The fi rm was prevented from being awarded 
the contract.
Upon further investigation, OAI confi rmed that a number of the end-user certifi cates submitted by Firm X were 
indeed fabricated. When presented with OAI’s fi ndings, Firm X admitted that the user documents were falsifi ed. 
It apologized for the consequences of its actions and requested leniency. The IOC considered Firm X’s prompt 
acknowledgment of its wrongdoing as a mitigating circumstance when it sanctioned Firm X for 3 years. The offi  cer 
of Firm X, who created and submitted the fraudulent documents allegedly without the fi rm’s knowledge, was 
sanctioned for 7 years for fraudulent and obstructive practices. The sanction was aggravated as he attempted to 
mislead OAI and refused to provide requested documents.
Firm X’s subsequent appeal for a further reduction of its sanction did not meet ADB’s appeal criteria and 
was, therefore, denied. 
Case Study—Temporary Suspension, Debarment, and Appeal
not available or known at the time OAI sought 
information or requested a response from the 
sanctioned fi rms and individuals regarding its 
fi ndings. Second, the information provided should 
be relevant to the decision to impose a sanction, 
either to the fi nding of an integrity violation or 
the type or severity of the sanction imposed. The 
SAC may reduce or lift sanctions or require OAI 
to reinvestigate and to resubmit the case to the 
IOC. The secretariat to the SAC screens appeals 
to determine their eligibility prior to presenting 
the appeal to the SAC. In 2013, to provide greater 
independence to the appeals process, a senior staff  
member independent of OAI acted as secretariat 
to the SAC.
OAI received nine appeals in 2013. Of these, eight 
were denied for not having met the two criteria, while 
one appeal for reduction of the debarment period 
was granted.
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Due Diligence
OAI adopts a collaborative approach in fulfi lling 
its due diligence activities. In its second full year of 
carrying out the mandate of providing independent 
advice on integrity due diligence (IDD) and anti-
money-laundering and combating the fi nancing 
of terrorism (AML/CFT) risks, OAI witnessed a 
dramatic increase in the number of requests for 
advice. From 15 referrals in 2012, OAI received 
requests to conduct 253 second-tier IDDs for 
referrals covering various nonsovereign, sovereign, 
fi nancial intermediation, and other projects. While 
the requests for advice were mostly from the Private 
Sector Operations Department (PSOD), OAI also 
assisted the operations departments in conducting 
IDD for fi nancial intermediation loans as well as the 
Offi  ce of Cofi nancing Operations (OCO) and the 
Regional and Sustainable Development Department 
(RSDD) for their consideration of potential partners 
including private corporations and foundations.
OAI’s IDD team continued to undertake 
improvements to integrate its eff orts with the rest of 
ADB. In 2013, OAI worked closely with the Offi  ce of 
the General Counsel (OGC) and PSOD in refi ning 
PSOD’s internal procedures, including a set of 
operational IDD checklists and Know-Your-Customer 
principles that provide for a uniform and consistent 
approach to IDD. In the same vein, OAI assisted OCO 
in formulating interim IDD guidelines for conducting 
IDDs on entities being considered for potential 
partnerships. This guidance is critical since incomplete 
or inaccurate IDD eff orts may have far-reaching 
Due diligence provides a potent opportunity for ADB to gather background information that may prevent a project 
from taking unnecessary and avoidable risks.
In one ADB project, a joint venture (JV) of two international fi rms appeared to enter into a subcontract agreement 
with Firm A. A letter of intent (LOI) for the JV to subcontract to Firm A and other fi rms was submitted to the 
executing agency and subsequently passed to ADB for approval.
Subsequent to receiving the LOI background checks conducted by ADB, it was discovered that Firm A had been 
dissolved prior to the submission of the LOI. In addition, Firm A is connected to a certain Mr. Y who was sued in 
a high court in Europe in relation to the management contract of a similar project. According to publicly available 
records, Mr. Y’s company defrauded a state-owned company by hundreds of millions of dollars. It was also 
established that Mr. Y had registered multiple companies in an intermediate jurisdiction in an attempt to hide his 
ownership of Firm A.
Further background checks established that there was no previous relationship between the JV and Firm A, and 
one of the JV fi rms confi rmed that no due diligence was conducted on Firm A. As a result of the due diligence 
fi ndings, Firm A was removed from the subcontract; the contract continued but ADB mitigated the integrity and 
reputational risk of the project involving the fi rm. This case illustrates the importance and impact of conducting 
appropriate due diligence on all entities proposed (contractors, JV partners, subcontractors, etc.) in the 
implementation of ADB projects, to manage inherent risks. Due diligence should therefore be a priority task for 
project teams at the earliest stage to correctly assess the legitimacy and repute of entities seeking to participate in 
ADB projects.
Case Study—Due Diligence Equals Risk Awareness and Risk Management 
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consequences for ADB, seriously impacting ADB’s 
reputation due to a failure to identify the risk from 
information that was available or readily obtainable.
Furthermore, OAI has emphasized the importance 
of disclosure. Observing appropriate disclosure 
serves a two-fold purpose—it places the relevant 
decision makers in an informed position before 
approving projects and it better prepares ADB to deal 
with associated issues that could surface anywhere 
within the project cycle. Through this approach, 
OAI eff ectively assists project teams to identify 
red fl ags and other potential risk areas that would 
have immediate or future adverse impacts on ADB 
projects, while emphasizing that IDD is a process that 
does not end with a Board approval of a project.
As in previous years, a vital element of maximizing 
the utility of OAI’s advisory function is to supplement 
it with valuable education and training sessions to 
ADB staff . In this regard, OAI conducted one-on-
one sessions with project offi  cers on how to refi ne 
searches and how to use other publicly available 
databases for their fi rst-tier IDD. Similarly, OAI 
highlighted IDDs in the mandatory induction 
programs for new ADB staff . On 7 May 2013, OAI, the 
Offi  ce of the Auditor General (OAG), and OGC 
co-organized a seminar that discussed recent 
regulatory actions against fi nancial institutions and 
failure of their internal controls, qualities of a good 
AML/CFT system, and examples of defi ciencies. 
Over 80 staff  attended the seminar.5
Apart from its advisory function, OAI supports 
the Budget, Personnel and Management Systems 
Department (BPMSD) by conducting pre-employment 
and related screening on external candidates for ADB 
staff  positions. In 2013, 224 checks were conducted. 
In May 2013, one of ADB's depository banks withheld a payment request for almost $500,000 as it may confl ict 
with United States (US) government sanctions. The payment was for civil works carried out by a contractor on 
an approved ADB-fi nanced power transmission project in Central and West Asia. The depository bank requested 
ADB to provide detailed information regarding the transaction and to confi rm whether the payment was directly or 
indirectly connected to US-sanctioned jurisdictions.
Responding to the Controller’s Department’s request for advice, OAI conducted additional "Know-Your-Customer" 
research into the contractor and initiated interdepartmental discussions with the project team, including the 
project counsel, to address the matter. OAI obtained confi rmation from the contractor that the performance of its 
contracts in the developing member countries under ADB projects had no links to any US-sanctioned jurisdictions, 
ADB provided the depository bank with additional information regarding the payment and also confi rmed that the 
payment concerned had no direct or indirect connection to the sanctioned jurisdictions. The depository bank, by 
virtue of ADB's confi rmation, subsequently released the payment to the contractor.
The international banking system's screening requirements related to international sanctions and anti-money-
laundering and combating the fi nancing of terrorism is one of the reasons why it is critical for ADB to continue to 
conduct due diligence on matters such as nonpayment to third parties (e.g., contractors on ADB projects). 
Case Study—ADB Strengthens Compliance with Global KYC Practice
5 OAI received the benefi t of an external service provider in conducting the seminar.
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AML and IDD Working Groups
In March and April 2013, ADB’s management 
approved the formation of two interdepartmental 
working groups: (i) the AML Working Group 
to coordinate eff orts across departments in 
strengthening ADB’s internal controls in relation 
to money laundering, fi nancing of terrorism, and 
sanctions risks; and (ii) the IDD Working Group to 
consider the development of IDD guidelines for 
identifying and managing integrity risks. OAI and 
OGC have been tasked to lead both working groups. 
The working groups will be working closely with 
an international expert on risk management and 
regulatory compliance to establish a benchmark 
for what constitutes best practice for international 
fi nancial institutions for internal controls in relation 
to money laundering, fi nancing of terrorism, and 
sanctions as well as integrity risks in sovereign 
operations involving fi nancial intermediaries, 
autonomous state-owned enterprises and private 
sector entities.
Expected outputs include a comparative analysis of 
ADB’s current internal controls and practices against 
these benchmarked standards and recommendations 
for any adjustments and improvements. The 
completion of the tasks of both the AML and IDD 
Working Groups is targeted for 2014. It is anticipated 
that ADB will undertake further action to implement 
the recommended changes to ADB’s policies, 
processes, and procedures in relation to AML, CFT, 
sanctions, and IDD.
Whistleblower Protection 
in OAI Investigations
Under ADB’s Whistleblower and Witness Protection 
Policy, Administrative Order (AO) 2.10, ADB pursues 
all reasonable steps to protect whistleblowers and 
witnesses acting in good faith and to ensure that they 
are not subject to retaliation. Any person who reports 
a suspected integrity violation or misconduct may 
remain anonymous or request that his or her name 
be kept confi dential.
In 2013, OAI reviewed 10 cases in which ADB’s 
Whistleblower and Witness Protection provisions 
were invoked to protect concerned ADB staff  and 
external parties who reported an allegation and 
requested that their identities be protected. Of these, 
two cases have been concluded without any adverse 
retaliation reports from the whistleblower to date. 
Eight cases are still undergoing review.
In addition, OAI received three claims of retaliation 
on whistleblowers. One case was resolved to the 
whistleblower’s satisfaction (resolution included job 
relocation). The second claim was determined by 
OAI as unqualifi ed for whistleblower protection since 
the complainant was not a whistleblower as defi ned 
under AO 2.10. The third case is still ongoing.
Learning and Development
Internal Learning and Development
In 2013, in partnership with BPMSD, OAI’s 
Anticorruption and Integrity training for new ADB 
staff  was made available in e-Learning format. This 
includes modules on (i) Introduction to Integrity, 
(ii) ADB’s Anticorruption Policy and Integrity 
Principles and Guidelines, (iii) How to Spot Red 
Flags in ADB Projects, and (iv) OAI’s Roles and 
Responsibilities. All new staff  must now complete 
this training on their fi rst day at ADB. This sets the 
tone for the importance that ADB places on ensuring 
that its funds are used solely for intended purposes.
OAI continued to off er targeted and specialized 
modules for ADB staff . OAI delivered modules under 
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the Advanced Project Design and Management 
courses and for the Mission Leadership courses. 
These modules are continuously updated to 
incorporate new insights and lessons learned from 
investigative and PPRR fi ndings.
As the requests for due diligence dramatically 
increased in 2013, OAI also continued to deliver 
due diligence training to staff  and rolled out a 
new induction training course focusing on fi rst-tier 
due diligence.
Protecting Projects by Empowering 
Executing Agencies, Implementing 
Agencies, and SAIs and Partnering 
with the Private Sector and Civil 
Society Organizations
As part of OAI’s mandate to help advance 
transparency and public accountability in developing 
member countries (DMCs), OAI has three ongoing 
regional technical assistance (RETA) programs—
RETA 6449, RETA 8176, and RETA 6447—which 
aim to promote good governance and sound 
development management. Through training, 
education, and information dissemination activities, 
OAI raises awareness of ADB’s Anticorruption Policy 
and shares fraud prevention skills with ADB staff , 
government offi  cials, consultants and contractors, 
and civil society representatives.
Since 2008, OAI has been conducting capacity 
building seminars through its RETA 6447: 
Anticorruption Seminars. These seminars are 
geared toward explaining ADB’s Anticorruption 
Policy and strengthening the skills to identify and 
respond to fraud, corruption, collusion, and 
coercion in procurement and implementation of 
members of the public and private sectors and 
civil society organizations that are or could be 
involved in ADB-fi nanced projects. Each seminar 
presentation is tailored to cater to a particular 
Capacity building and anticorruption seminar
Photo: OAI
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sector (i.e., energy, transport, natural resources 
management, consultants and contractors, civil 
society organizations, etc.), and, if available, 
features a number of sample case studies that are 
local to each DMC. In 2013, OAI held seminars 
in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Cambodia. The 
remaining three seminars to be conducted under 
RETA 6447 are expected to take place during the 
fi rst and second quarters of 2014.
Such learning and development eff orts will continue 
to be part of OAI’s work in 2014. In response to 
the feedback received from seminar and workshop 
participants, OAI developed a new RETA (8609) 
aimed at enhancing the knowledge and skills of 
project stakeholders in identifying, detecting, and 
preventing corruption, fraud, money laundering, and 
other integrity violations in ADB-fi nanced projects. 
RETA 8609 was approved on 13 December 2013.
In addition, in 2013, OAI conducted three Forensic 
Accounting Workshops for over 150 auditors and 
investigators from the Commission on Audit of the 
Republic of the Philippines, the State Audit Offi  ce of 
Viet Nam, private auditing and accounting fi rms in 
Viet Nam, the Anticorruption Commission in 
Bangladesh, and the Offi  ce of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General in Bangladesh under RETAs 6449 
and 8176. Among the topics discussed were fraud 
concepts, vulnerable areas and red fl ags in public 
procurement, and lessons learned from ADB-
fi nanced projects. The participants found the variety 
of learning contents and interactive platforms helpful. 
While RETA 64496 targeted participants primarily 
from supreme audit institutions (SAI), RETA 8176 has 
an expanded scope that includes the private sector—
existing and potential consultants, contractors, 
suppliers, and civil society representatives. OAI 
Ma. Leonor Gerona-Robredo shares her experiences in promoting good governance during International Anticorruption Day.  Also in picture (from right 
to left) are Heartfi le President and Founder Sania Nishtar; ADB President Takehiko Nakao; OAI Head Clare Wee; and RSDD Deputy Director General 
Woochong Um.
Photo: OAI
6 The objectives of RETA 6449 are to transfer fraud detection and prevention skills to SAIs through on-the-job training during PPRR 
fi eldwork and through training workshops at the completion of each PPRR.
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conducted three Anticorruption Awareness seminars 
for the private sector reaching over 180 potential and 
existing ADB partners in Bangladesh, Cambodia, the 
Philippines, and Viet Nam. In these seminars, OAI 
presented ADB’s Anticorruption Policy and explained 
sanctionable practices. Furthermore, OAI encouraged 
attendees to be ADB’s partner in the fi ght against 
fraud and corruption by reporting any potential 
integrity violations encountered.
Other Activities: Communications 
and Outreach
In 2013, OAI issued advisories, articles, updates on 
sanctions, and other information on ADB’s intranet 
site to assist staff  in detecting and preventing integrity 
violations. It published 102 anticorruption advisories 
to staff  via ADB Today, an internal daily news bulletin. 
It issued its quarterly online publication Anticorruption 
and Integrity e-Bulletin with feature articles on OAI’s 
training activities, cross debarment updates, PPRRs, 
and ways to enhance the success and integrity 
of project implementation. A special issue of the 
Anticorruption and Integrity e-Bulletin was published 
to coincide with ADB’s celebrations on International 
Anticorruption Day. The OAI 2012 Annual Report was 
launched online in March 2013 and made available in 
hard copy in April 2013.
The web (www.adb.org/integrity) continues to be 
important for OAI in disseminating news releases, 
advisories, and updates about ADB’s anticorruption 
activities to the public.
For the third year, OAI, in cooperation with RSDD, 
celebrated International Anticorruption Day with 
a series of learning events on 2–5 December and a 
main breakfast event on 9 December. In his opening 
address to ADB staff , President Nakao stressed that 
the staff ’s collective action can make a diff erence 
for the benefi t of the people whom ADB serves. He 
was joined by Sania Nishtar, Founder and President 
of Heartfi le and Former Caretaker Federal Minister 
of the Government of Pakistan, and Ma. Leonor 
Gerona-Robredo, member of the Philippine House of 
Representatives for the Third District of Camarines 
Sur. The guest speakers shared with ADB staff  their 
work and advocacy toward the promotion of good 
governance and anticorruption in their respective 
countries and the rest of Asia and the Pacifi c. 
The year’s celebrations highlighted the eff orts of 
ADB resident missions and DMCs in strengthening 
countries’ integrity systems and anticorruption 
activities. It also introduced the engagement of civil 
society in ADB’s anticorruption eff orts. Throughout 
the year, OAI organized various initiatives to extend 
the iACT: I Fight Corruption! message to resident 
missions through the distribution of iACT posters 
and presentations focused on empowering and 
engaging resident mission staff  as frontliners in ADB’s 
anticorruption eff orts.
Collaboration with Multilateral 
Development Banks
OAI maintains proactive collaboration with 
multilateral development bank (MDB) partners, 
ensuring continued cross-border evolvement in its 
investigations and other anticorruption eff orts. In 
2013, OAI made a commitment toward exchanging 
training materials and case studies to develop 
harmonized best practices and a coordinated 
approach to IDD training as well as the development 
of a harmonized code of conduct for investigators.
Cross debarment continues to embody the collective 
curative force of the MDB community against integrity 
violations. A total of 328 entities were cross debarred 
across MDBs in 2013. The World Bank’s debarment 
of SNC Lavalin and 198 of its related entities in April 
2013 more than doubled the total presented for cross 
debarment between 2010 and 2012.
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Table 3 Cross Debarments (2010–2013)
MDB
2010 2011 2012 2013 TOTAL
OVERALL 
TOTALFirm Individual Firm Individual Firm Individual Firm Individual Firm Individual
ADB 0 0 11 16  1  0   2  2  14 18 32
EBRD 0 0  4  0  0  0   0  0   4  0 4
IADB 0 0  0  0 23 45   1  2  24 47 71*
WB 9 3 33 12 34  6 301 20 377 41 418**
TOTAL 12 76 109 328
Total Cross Debarment by MDBs (2010–2013) 419 106 525
Reinstated (2010–2013)  7  3  10
Current Cross Debarment by MDBs 412 103 515
Current Cross Debarment by ADB 398  85 483
* All fi rms and individuals from non-ADB members
**  Includes 75 fi rms and 16 individuals from non-ADB members
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Staff  Composition of OAI, 2008-2014
Position 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*
Head 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Director 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Lead Integrity Specialist 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Principal Integrity Specialist 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
Senior Integrity Specialist 1 1 2 0 0 0 0
Integrity Specialist 3 3 4 4 5 6 6
Senior Integrity Offi  cer 1 1 1 1 1 2*** 2
Integrity Offi  cer 1 2 3 3 3** 1**** 1
Associate Integrity Analyst/
Associate Integrity Offi  cer 1 2 2 2 3 4 4
Assistant Integrity Coordinator/
Integrity Analyst 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Executive/Senior Integrity 
Assistant 0 0 1 2 2 2 2
Integrity Assistant 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Total 12 15 19 20 21 22 22
* Estimate
** Includes one position which was vacant at time of publication
*** Prior to publication, one Integrity Offi  cer, previously listed on page 14 of OAI's 2012 Annual Report, was promoted to Senior Integrity Offi  cer 
**** The integrity offi  cer position identifi ed in Page 14 of OAI’s 2012 Annual Report did not materialize
APPENDIX 1
The Offi  ce of Anticorruption and Integrity
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There were 31 cases which led to debarment in 2013. A sample of instructive cases are summarized below.
Allegations Investigative Findings Case Resolution
Collusion
Collusion between bidders Firms A, B, and C bid for an offi  ce refurbishment contract. 
However, the fi rms were related. Mr. X, the representative of 
Firm A, is the owner of Firm B. Mr. X is also acquainted with 
the owner/representative of Firm C. 
The individuals and fi rms prepared their proposals in 
collusion with each other in order to ensure that one of them 
wins the contract.
The IOC debarred Firm A and its 
owner for 3 years. The IOC debarred 
Firms B and C, their respective 
owners and representatives for 
4 years.
Collusion and Fraud
Collusion and 
misrepresentation of 
experience in CV
An OAI staff  investigation determined that a consultant 
misrepresented his experience as a translator in his CV and 
colluded with an ADB staff  member to obtain a contract 
from ADB. The consultant did not dispute OAI’s fi ndings of 
fraudulent and collusive practices. 
The consultant accepted OAI’s 
recommended sanction of 6-year 
debarment.
Fraud
Misrepresentation of work 
experience
A fi rm, in response to the executing agency’s request 
to submit documents to substantiate its claimed work 
experience, submitted fabricated documents.
The fi rm admitted that its claim of work experience was 
false and that the documents it presented were fraudulent. 
It informed OAI that it had taken action against relevant 
offi  cers and was taking steps to improve internal governance 
in its operations.
The fi rm and its authorized 
representative accepted OAI’s 
proposed sanction of 3-year 
debarment. 
Submission of false bid 
security
A fi rm, through its director/authorized signatory, submitted a 
falsifi ed bid security in the fi rm’s bid. 
The IOC debarred the fi rm and its 
director/authorized signatory for 
4 years.
Misrepresentation of work 
experience in individual’s CV
A consultant submitted CVs with confl icting experiences. 
The consultant denied any misrepresentation and claimed 
to have aligned his CV to fi t the corresponding terms of 
reference advertised. However, he failed to provide copies of 
his academic and work records to substantiate his claim.
OAI independently verifi ed that the consultant had falsely 
claimed postgraduate qualifi cations.
The IOC debarred the consultant for 
4 years. 
APPENDIX 2
A Sample of Cases Concluded in 2013 Involving 
ADB-Financed Activities
continued on next page
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Allegations Investigative Findings Case Resolution
Similarities in the contents of 
two competing bids
Firm A and Firm B appeared to submit bids with near 
identical content. During OAI’s investigation, Firm A denied 
ever submitting a bid for the project and provided a letter 
from Firm B admitting that it had fraudulently submitted the 
bid in the name of Firm A without the latter’s knowledge and 
consent. 
Firm B and its president/director 
did not contest OAI’s fi ndings of 
fraudulent practice and accepted 
OAI’s proposed sanction of 3-year 
debarment. 
Submission of fraudulent 
work certifi cate
A fi rm was disqualifi ed by the executing agency for 
submitting a false work certifi cate. OAI independently 
confi rmed that the work certifi cate was fraudulent.
The IOC debarred the fi rm and 
its managing partner/authorized 
representative for 4 years. 
Submission of consultants’ 
CVs: (i) without consent 
and (ii) containing false 
information. 
A fi rm submitted CVs of consultants without obtaining their 
consent. 
In response to OAI’s inquiry, the fi rm and its executive 
director/chairperson submitted purported engagement and 
withdrawal letters from the consultants, which were later 
proven to be falsifi ed.
The IOC debarred the fi rm and its 
executive director/chairperson for 4 
years.
Submission of fraudulent 
end-user certifi cates
A fi rm which had been declared technically nonresponsive 
for a previous water supply project valued at $10 million (on 
the grounds that it had insuffi  cient experience on similar 
projects) was shortlisted as the top-ranked bidder for a 
$19 million water supply project. It submitted end-user 
certifi cates claiming to have the necessary experience. OAI 
confi rmed that the end-user certifi cates submitted by the 
fi rm were fabricated. When presented with OAI’s fi ndings, 
the fi rm admitted to engaging in fraudulent practice.
Given the strong evidence of 
fraudulent practice, and the fact 
that the contract was about to 
be awarded, the IOC temporarily 
suspended the fi rm for 6 months, and 
the fi rm was prevented from being 
awarded the $19 million water supply 
project contract.
Upon the conclusion of OAI’s 
investigation, the IOC debarred the 
fi rm and its offi  cer for 3 and 7 years, 
respectively. 
Submission of fraudulent 
certifi cate
Firms A and B submitted manufacturer’s authorization 
purportedly issued by the same company in relation to their 
respective bids in a power project. Both claimed that the 
manufacturer’s authorization submitted by the other was 
fraudulent. A project implementing agency verifying the 
authenticity of the manufacturer’s authorization received 
representations from Firm C, through its manager Mr. X, that 
Firm B’s authorization was genuine.
Upon investigation, OAI found that the manufacturer’s 
authorization submitted by Firm A was genuine, while that of 
Firm B was fabricated.
OAI also determined that Firm C and Mr. X were affi  liated 
with Firm B. In addition, another fi rm, Firm D, was also related 
to Firm B (i.e., both were under common control). 
Firm B and its CEO accepted OAI’s 
fi ndings and proposed sanction of 5 
years. To avoid the circumvention of 
the sanction, the IOC also imposed a 
sanction of 7 years on Firm C and its 
proprietor, and 5 years on Firm D. 
Table continued
continued on next page
A Sample of Cases Concluded in 2013 Involving ADB-Financed Activities
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Allegations Investigative Findings Case Resolution
Misrepresentation through 
omission
Firm E reassigned all contract responsibilities, obligations and 
responsibilities to a third party, which failed to deliver on the 
contract.
OAI confi rmed that: (i) the contract was wholly reassigned 
to a third party, which was specifi cally disallowed under this 
procurement; (ii) Firm E failed to inform the executing agency 
of this, also an obligation under this procurement; (iii) the 
subcontracting arrangement was in place after the awarding 
of the contract, but before the contract was signed; and (iv) 
construction was substandard and not fi nalized.
The IOC debarred Firm E and its 
principal for 7 years.
Sanctions Violation
Sanctions violation A fi rm sanctioned for fraudulent practices violated its sanction 
by bidding for and receiving a new ADB-fi nanced $1.4 million 
contract to supply machinery. The fi rm’s local representative 
submitted the bid proposal for the contract shortly after the 
sanction was imposed, and also signed the contract on the 
fi rm’s behalf. The fi rm had appealed its original sanction, 
and was in regular communication with OAI on the matter. 
Nevertheless, the fi rm did not inform OAI of the new contract 
in a transparent manner, and initially provided incorrect 
information regarding the new contract.
The IOC sanctioned the fi rm for 
3 years to run concurrently with the 
present debarment. The name of 
the fi rm was also submitted for cross 
debarment and posted on ADB’s 
public website. 
Sanctions violation A fi rm, which was sanctioned by the IOC for 7 years, 
submitted a bid for an ADB technical assistance project 
as a subconsultant of a consortium. A review of the bid 
showed that (i) the lead fi rm, in the letter of bid, declared 
that ADB has not sanctioned the consultant and any of its 
subconsultants, and (ii) the contact person (director) for 
the sanctioned fi rm in the consortium was the same director 
named in and who received the fi rm’s sanction letter.
When OAI presented its fi ndings to the fi rm and the 
individual, they agreed not to contest OAI’s fi ndings of 
sanction violation and fraudulent practice. 
The fi rm accepted OAI’s 
recommended sanction of 2-year 
debarment. Therefore, the fi rm’s 
7-year sanction was extended by 
another 2 years. Furthermore, the 
name of the fi rm was also submitted 
for cross debarment and posted on 
ADB’s public website. 
Table continued
Appendix 2
21
OAI screened and/or investigated 20 staff -related cases during 2013. Only a sample of instructive cases are summarized 
here. 
Allegations Investigative Findings Case Resolution
Confl ict of Interest and Misrepresentation
A staff  member was allegedly 
confl icted by recommending 
his spouse to work as 
consultant. He was also 
alleged to have engaged in 
corruption and abuse of 
authority.
OAI uncovered suffi  cient evidence to conclude that the 
staff  member engaged in fraudulent practices and abuse of 
authority. He was confl icted in the performance of his offi  cial 
duties.
He also engaged in collusive practices. In addition, his 
misconduct was recurrent and deliberate.
The matter was referred to BPMSD 
for disciplinary action.
Staff  was dismissed.
Collusion and Corruption
A staff  member allegedly 
favors certain contractors 
and infl uences their hiring, 
receives bribes from ADB 
contractors and engages in a 
private business. 
OAI found that the “favorite contractors” used the same 
offi  ce equipment as the rest of their counterparts. 
OAI found it diffi  cult to establish that some contractors were 
hired due to the staff  member’s recommendation.
OAI did not fi nd any business records of the staff  member or 
any recorded business relationships between him and any of 
the contractors.
The complainant did not provide suffi  cient information to 
enable OAI to investigate the allegation of bribery.
The allegations were not verifi able 
nor credible.
Case closed.*
A staff  member allegedly 
accepted kickbacks from 
suppliers, facilitated the 
recruitment of his family and 
close friends as ADB staff  
and consultants, and abused 
ADB's leave policy.
OAI’s investigations did not fi nd evidence that the staff  
member accepted kickbacks or that there was any monetary 
relationship between him and ADB suppliers.
None of the staff  member’s family members have been or are 
currently engaged in ADB as consultants or staff .
The staff  member’s attendance records show that his leave 
applications were properly recorded. Also, there were no 
discrepancies in his leave encashment.
The allegations were disproved.
Case closed.*
A staff  member who is 
married to a Philippine 
national allegedly claims 
rental subsidy and leases the 
house owned by the spouse. 
The complainant did not identify the staff  member so OAI 
fi ltered the list of ADB staff  who lived in a particular area and 
found one staff  member who matched the description of the 
complainant. 
This staff  member has been leasing the property since his 
employment in ADB. Said property was owned by a Filipino 
who had no relationship with the staff  member’s spouse.
The allegation was unverifi able.
Case closed.*
APPENDIX 3
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Allegations Investigative Findings Case Resolution
Confl ict of Interest
A staff  member is alleg-
edly positioning himself in a 
government offi  ce for future 
work engagements after 
retirement in ADB.
The staff  member is the project offi  cer and the government 
offi  ce is the executing agency for the project. As such, it is not 
extraordinary that the staff  member liaises with the executing 
agency for the successful implementation and performance 
of the project.
OAI has not been presented with any information to 
suggest that the staff  member was positioning himself in the 
executing agency. The complainant’s concern was merely 
speculative.
The allegation was not credible.
Case closed.*
A staff  member allegedly 
engaged in confl ict of inter-
est by being involved in the 
award of an ADB contract to 
a company that he founded.
OAI determined that the ADB staff  member was one of 
the initial founders and shareholders of the company. This 
company received an ADB contract for a training event under 
the project involving the ADB staff  member.
However, prior to the award of the contract, the staff  member 
disclosed to his supervisor his prior interest in the company 
and that he sold his shares before joining ADB. He also wrote 
to ADB management confi rming that he had no business or 
familial relationship with any of the principals of the company 
and that he had not violated ADB rules related to confl ict of 
interest. 
OAI confi rmed that the staff  member had sold his interests 
in the company and that management was fully aware of 
his previous role with the company prior to the award of the 
contract.
The allegation was not credible.
Case closed.*
* No referrals were made to BPMSD given the case outcome.
Note: He/his/him is used for convenience and is not gender-specifi c.
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APPENDIX 4
Process for Dealing with Allegations of Integrity 
Violations by ADB Sta 
ADB = Asian Development Bank; AO = Administrative Order; BPHP = Human Resources Business Partners Division; BPMSD = Budget, Personnel, 
and Management Systems Department; OAI = O  ce of Anticorruption and Integrity.
Notes: The fl owchart is not intended to, and does not replace, modify, supersede, or amend ADB's Integrity Principles and Guidelines (2012).
Misconduct by sta  members that OAI may investigate includes violation of ADB's Anticorruption Policy (including fraudulent practices, 
corrupt practices, or confl icts of interest) or abuse (theft, waste, or improper use of ADB assets, either committed intentionally or through 
reckless disregard).
OAI receives an allegation of
integrity violation by a sta OAI director approves the
closing report and, if appropriate,
refers to BPHP
ADB President
makes a fi nal decision
Sta  member is disciplined
and/or the case is closed
No sanction imposed.
OAI director endorses the
closing report; the OAI head
approves the closing report
Appeals Committee investigates
and makes a recommendation
to the President
OAI screens the allegation
OAI director approves the investigation plan
no
no
yes
yes
yes
no
OAI investigates the allegation
OAI reports its fi ndings to BPMSD
BPMSD determines the disciplinary
action and informs the sta  member
Sta  member requests compulsory 
conciliation from the BPHP director 
within 45 calendar days from date of receipt 
of the decision
Sta  member requests for
administrative review from the BPMSD
director general within 15 calendar days
Sta  member appeals the decision of 
the BPMSD director general to the Appeals
Committee through its secretary
Is there su  cient
evidence that the
Anticorruption Policy or
AO 2.02 was
violated?
Was the conciliation
successful?
Is the allegation
within OAI's mandate
credible, verifi able,
and material?
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APPENDIX 5
Process for Dealing with Allegations of Integrity Violations 
Involving Bidders, Consultants, Contractors, Suppliers, 
or Other Third Parties in ADB-Related Activities
ADB = Asian Development Bank; IA = implementing agency; IOC = Integrity Oversight Committee; OAI = O  ce of Anticorruption and Integrity; RD = 
regional departments; RM = resident mission; SAC = Sanction Appeals Committee.
a  At any time during the investigation, OAI may present to the IOC a request for a temporary suspension of the party (see paras. 72–77 of the 2012 
Integrity Principles and Guidelines, http://www.adb.org/sites/default/fi les/integrity-principle-guidelines.pdf).
Notes: The fl owchart is not intended to, and does not replace, modify, supersede, or amend ADB's Integrity Principles and Guidelines (2012).
Integrity violations that OAI may investigate include corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, coercive practice, collusive practice, abuse, confl ict of 
interest, obstructive practice.
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
OAI receives allegation of integrity 
violation involving ADB-related activities OAI director closes
the complaint
The sanction notice is issued
and case is closed
OAI presents its fi ndings
(if applicable, with recommended sanction)
and allows the subject opportunity 
to responda
OAI director endorses closing
of investigation;
OAI head approves it
OAI director approves the 
investigation plan
OAI submits its fi ndings to the IOC
The case is closed
IOC makes a decision on sanctions
SAC secretariat considers the appeal The sanction is upheld,
or the case is closed
ADB President makes a decision if the
SAC is unable to agree unanimously.
Is the allegation
within OAI's mandate
credible, verifi able,
and material?
Is there su  cient
evidence that the
Anticorruption Policy
was violated?
Did the party refuse OAI
recommended sanction?
Did the debarred
party fi le an appeal
within 90 days?
Was new and 
relevant information
presented?
OAI screens the allegation
OAI investigates the allegation
IOC secretariat advises debarred
fi rms and/or individuals
(if applicable, RDs, RMs, and IAs)
of the decision
SAC decides whether to confi rm sanction,
lift sanction or reassess evidence.
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Project Procurement–Related Review Process
ADB = Asian Development Bank, EA = executing agency, DMC = developing member country, IA = implementing agency, SAI = supreme 
audit institution.
Preliminary planning phase:
Identify projects
Seek inputs from operations department
Invite SAI to participate
Notify ADB stakeholders
Field work phase:
Obtain relevant documents from EA/IA
Review documentation
Physically verify at site
Wrap-up mission and closing conference
Interact with project and fi nance
team for clarifi cations
Discuss and agree fi ndings 
with EA
Reporting phase:
Send draft report for offi  cial comments
Transmit fi nal report to SAI, DMC, 
and ADB
Detailed planning phase:
Understand project operations
Engage consultants
Determine sample sizes
Send review details to SAI
Engage with EA
Provide review requirements
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